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Abstract
Open source software development (OSSD) is a community-oriented, network-centric 
approach to building complex software systems. OSSD projects are typically organized 
as edge organizations that lack an explicit management regime to control and coordinate 
decentralized project work. However, a growing number of OSSD projects are 
developing, delivering, and supporting large-scale software systems that are displacing 
proprietary software alternatives. The U.S. Department of Defense is now committed to 
the adoption and deployment of software-intensive systems with open architectures and 
OSS components for application areas including command and control systems. Recent 
empirical studies of OSSD projects reveal that OSS developers often self-organize into 
organizational forms we characterize as evolving socio-technical interaction networks 
(STINs). These STINs emerge in ways that effectively control semi-autonomous OSS 
developers and coordinate project activities to produce reliable and adaptive software 
systems. In this paper, we examine how practices and processes enable and govern edge 
organizations like OSSD projects when coalesced and configured as contingent, socio-
technical interaction networks. In so doing, we draw on results from two ongoing case 
studies of governance activities and elements in a small and a large OSSD project.
Keywords: open source software, governance, decentralized organizations, edge 
organizations
Introduction and overview
What are the best known ways and means for governing open source software 
development (OSSD)? Answering this question has been the focus of a number of 
research publications and recent presentations (described below). Why? That is, why is 
there now such a growing research interest in OSSD governance? Part of this stems from 
the interests of government or industry practitioners who seek to provide insight, 
explanatory frameworks, and guidance to others trying to account for how to integrate 
OSS products into existing management regimens.  Another community of OSS scholars 
seeks to understand and explain how OSSD projects enact adaptive, situated, yet informal 
processes that effectively self-organize and govern OSSD practices without traditional 
project management or administrative regimes for resource control/allocation and 
decision-making authority. Similarly, a new cadre of business ventures and consultancies 
are also emerging seeking to advice commercial enterprises, government agencies, and 
others about what advice/assistance they need in order to adopt and integrate OSS into 
their current IT systems and operations.
In this paper, we contribute to this growing understanding for how to characterize the 
ways and means for affecting governance within and across OSSD projects, as well as the 
participants and technologies that enable these projects and the larger communities of 
practice in which they operate and interact. Specifically, our contribution centers around 
providing an alternative perspective and analytical construct that offers multi-level 
analysis and explanation, as well as a framework for comparison and generalization 
based on empirical studies of OSSD projects, work practices, development processes, and 
community dynamics [cf. Scacchi 2007b]. The perspective draws from socio-technical 
interaction networks (STINs) [Scacchi 2005] as a persistent organizational form for 
collective action with/through technical (computing) work systems, and also puts forward 
STINs as the analytical construct that serves as an organizing concept, configurational 
form [Markus 2007], and adaptive process that both enacts and explains how governance 
in OSSD projects is realized and directed.
Overall, it is our current opinion that the governance practices enacted through STINs 
found in OSSD projects can be framed as possible options for understanding how 
network-centric edge organizations can operate without an explicit centralized command 
authority. Further, these STINs act in a self-organizing manner to effectively realize a 
decentralized approach to organize and control a dispersed, somewhat autonomous work 
force. This in turn can then be used to both understand (a) the possible roles of OSSD 
organizational practices in the development, deployment, and support of future command 
and control systems, and (b) where and how such practices could be used in support of 
contemporary military activity and organization [cf. Justice 2007, Starrett 2007]. 
This paper therefore organized to review what is currently known about governance 
activities, forms, and processes in OSSD projects, to identify the analytical elements of 
OSSD governance, to employ case study results to articulate these analytical elements, 
and to discuss how the elements observed in these results begin to layout how governance 
works in an OSSD project, and how this might serve as a new model for describing how 
governance forms in network-centric, edge organizations might operate more generally.
Related research
In broad terms, there are two kinds of efforts currently gaining attention regarding how 
best to understand governance and OSSD. The first focuses attention to what we will call 
“extrinsic issues” of governance and OSSD, while the second focuses on “intrinsic 
issues”. A focus on extrinsic issues draw attention for how best to govern the results, 
outcomes, or products arising from OSSD projects, or matters like economic analysis of 
OSS licenses, contracts, and economic rents [cf. Demil and Lecocq 2006, Franck and 
Jungwirth 2003]. In contrast, a focus on intrinsic issues of governance attends to matters 
associated with OSS development activities, actors, project communities, and 
surrounding organizations that seek to encourage, facilitate, protect, or prosecute OSSD 
projects and collective action. Intrinsic issues address matters pertaining to decision-
making authority, resource allocation, personal motives, leadership, social control, 
coordination mechanisms, organizational forms, etc.
OSS Governance within DoD
Within the world of the DoD, there is great interest in extrinsic issues of OSS 
governance, and little/no comparable interest currently being directed to intrinsic 
governance issues. To wit, effort is presently being marshaled and put into practice for 
how best to govern the adoption, acquisition, and assimilation of OSS products, and how 
to integrate such practices into current project management regimens. Government-
Industry presentations by Golden [2007], Justice [2007], Risacher [2007]. and others 
[DACS 2007] all focus attention to how best to govern or manage OSS products (or their 
licenses), and tend to slight/ignore the socio-technical processes and project communities 
that create, evolve, and sustain these products [Scacchi and Alspaugh 2008].
Outside of the DoD world, there is recent flow of research examining a variety of 
intrinsic issues that attempt to characterize or explain how governance is achieved or 
realized within OSSD projects. 
OSS Governance beyond DoD
Shah [2006] identifies mechanisms that serve to help govern OSSD activities in the two 
OSSD project communities she studied that include decision-making rights, property 
rights, proprietary modifications, and restrictions on modification and redistribution.  Use 
of these governance mechanisms helps to determine how an OSSD project strikes a 
balance between traditional concerns for organizational control of property while 
accommodating the informal collective needs of those who will voluntarily share the 
results of their labor, as long as they do not feel exploited. 
O'Mahony [2007] also finds a hybrid governance form in OSSD project community she 
studied that allows for private parties to participate and gain advantage, while also 
contributing to the growth of the informal project community. She identifies fives 
principles of community managed governance that include autonomous participation and 
decentralized decision-making among others. 
Markus [2007] adds to these results through a secondary analysis of prior OSSD studies 
that sought to identify governance issues that  appear in the background of those studies. 
She finds that different studies of different OSSD projects reveal different patterns of 
governance practices, processes, and mechanisms. This leads her to observe that 
governance in OSSD projects is better viewed as configurational—following from a 
distinct configuration of collective social actions and technical system arrangements (e.g., 
specific OSS tools in use). We find her configurational governance concept similar in 
form to our socio-technical interaction networks [Scacchi 2005, Scacchi 2007b], also as a 
situated and contingent configuration of interrelated social actions, technical systems, and 
the collective work practices and development processes that can bring them together in 
persistent, yet continuously emerging OSSD projects and products.  
Last, in a survey by de Latt [2007], he finds a distinction between what he calls 
spontaneous governance, internal governance, and governance toward outside parties, all 
of which we group under intrinsic governance issues. Though he does not provide any 
results for extrinsic governance, he does provide a framing that accounts for governance 
of OSS product development as arising from different types of social networks [cf. de 
Latt 2004]. 
Analytical Levels and Elements for Understanding Governance in OSSD Projects
Beyond the related research efforts identified above, other empirical studies of OSSD 
reveal that OSSD work practices, engineering processes, and project community 
dynamics can best be understood through observation and examination of their socio-
technical elements from multiple levels of analysis [Scacchi 2007b]. In particular, OSSD 
projects can be examined through a “micro-level” analysis of (a) the actions, beliefs, and 
motivations of individual OSSD project participants, and (b) the social or technical 
resources that are mobilized and configured to support, subsidize, and sustain OSSD 
work and outcomes [Scacchi 2007a]. Similarly, OSSD projects can be examined through 
“meso-level” analysis of (c) patterns of cooperation, coordination, control, leadership, 
role migration, and conflict mitigation, and (d) project alliances and inter-project socio-
technical networking [de Latt 2004]. Last, OSSD projects can also be examined through 
“macro-level” analysis of (d) multi-project OSS ecosystems, and (e) OSSD as a social 
movement and emerging global culture. As such, we will provide a multi-level analysis 
of the elements of OSSD governance. 
We will engage in our multi-level analysis of the elements of OSSD governance using 
results drawn primarily from two ongoing, longitudinal case studies of OSSD projects. 
These projects are respectively associated with the GNUe.org [Elliott and Scacchi 2005, 
Elliott, Ackerman, and Scacchi 2007, Scacchi 2007a] and NetBeans.org [Jensen and 
Scacchi 2005, 2007] Web sites, where these projects can be found. GNUe.org is focused 
on the development and use of software components and libraries for developing 
electronic business applications and services [Scacchi 2007a]. GNUe.org is a small 
OSSD project with about 20 or so regular project contributors over its last six years of 
development. NetBeans.org is focused on the development, support, and evolution of an 
Integrated Development Environment (IDE), which is a tool for developing Web-based 
enterprise software applications coded in the Java programming language that utilize 
other Java-based software products and services, such as those offered by Sun 
Microsystems Inc. [Jensen and Scacchi 2005]. NetBeans.org is a very large OSSD project 
with more than 400,000 active users of its IDE, and has contribution to the project from 
tens of thousands of project participants. As such, it should not be surprising that our case 
studies are not congruent in their examination of OSSD governance elements, since our 
studies examine a very large and a small OSSD project, and thus were not conceived to 
be directly comparable in that way. Nonetheless, we recognize and acknowledge this 
limitation in order to move forward to layout what we have observed and learned so far 
with respect to OSSD governance, where we more see more elements of governance in 
the larger and more diverse NetBeans.org project community, while we more clearly see 
micro-level elements for individual action in the smaller, more personal GNUe.org OSSD 
project.
Finally, it is our view that the elements of OSSD governance span these multiple levels of 
analysis because they coalesce and are actively configured by OSSD project participants 
into network forms for collective action—networks we designate as socio-technical 
interaction networks (STINs) [Scacchi 2005]. Why? Our observation drawn from our 
own studies of OSSD and those of others [de Latt 2004, 2007, Markus 2007, Scacchi 
2007b] suggest to us that governance activities, efforts, and mechanisms are not disjoint 
or unrelated to one another, but instead are arrayed and configured by OSSD project 
participants into networks for mobilizing socio-technical interactions, resources, rules, 
and organizational forms. Project participants are only accountable to each other, and not 
to corporate owners, senior executives, or stock investors. They can often suffice with 
lightweight governance forms that they configure and adapt to their needs and situations, 
rather than to budget, schedules, or profit growth. Accordingly, the choose organizational 
forms that are neither purely decentralized market (or “bazaar”) nor a centralized 
hierarchy (or “cathedral”), but instead choose a more general network form that can be 
more readily be adapted to local contingencies or emergent conditions that arise in the 
interactions among project participants, the technical computing systems/resources at 
hand, or the joint socio-technical system that is the OSSD project. Thus, our multi-level 
analysis is one that is construed to draw attention to the persistent yet adaptive STINs that 
participants enact to span and govern OSSD projects, practices, and processes that arise 
at different levels of socio-technical interaction.
Micro-level analysis of OSSD governance
Our analysis of OSSD governance begins by examining what elements of 
individual/participant action and what resources can OSSD project participants mobilize 
to help govern the overall activities of their  project work and contributions. These are 
examined in turn.
Accounting for Individual Actions and Resources
Why will OSSD project participants contribute so much of themselves, often on a 
voluntarily basis, to a OSSD project? In simple terms, they recognize and experience 
intrinsic motivations that serve their own self-interest. In a project like GNUe.org, the 
most commonly cited reasons for why participants continue to contribute to the project 
includes their desire to: (a) learn about new GNUe tools through using and enhancing 
them; (b) have fun building software with other people who also enjoy building the 
GNUe software; (c) exercise technical skills that their regular jobs might not 
accommodate; (d) to try out the GNUe software in their regular workplace or with their 
business clients; and (e) to interconnect with other OSS developers working on other 
OSSD projects that may or may not be related to GNUe.org. However, in realizing these 
personal incentives, the GNUe.org participants also (f) build trust and reputation with one 
another, while (f) the project's core developers (who change over time) realize “geek 
fame” and recognition as technical authority or “lead” of the current GNUe software 
system architecture. Furthermore, to be sure that the active GNUe.org software 
contributors know who is doing what, what is going on, and why, (g) developers spend 
much of their time as a project participant reading about what others are doing, have 
done, or are talking about using regular project communication channels, like Internet 
Relay Chat and project digest summaries [cf. Elliott, Ackerman, and Scacchi 2007]. 
These (a) through (g) elements collectively act to constrain what gets done, and how it 
gets done, so that GNUe.org developers believe that they do not require project managers 
or project development schedules in order to govern the themselves or the technical 
direction of the GNUe development effort [Elliott and Scacchi 2005]. The effort will only 
go where the participants want to take it.
Beyond the intrinsic motivations of GNUe.org developers, these participants also 
mobilize a variety of their personal resources at their disposal [Scacchi 2007a]. This is 
done in order to make clear their commitment to the project, the other participants in the 
project community, and to the technical choices, system architecture, and overall 
development trajectory that are guiding/governing their collective OSSD efforts. The 
resources that participants put into play include their: (i) personal computing resources 
(including their PCs, network file servers, and data repositories); (ii) beliefs supporting 
the moral value and rightness for developing software that can be freely accessed by 
others, studied, modified, and redistribution into perpetuity; (iii) routine use of a 
multitude of various software “informalisms” [Scacchi 2002] to communicate different 
socio-technical issues to project members or outsiders; (iv) technical skill as a competent 
as a software developer, and their social skill in working well with others whom they may 
at times disagree with on technical matters; (v) discretionary time and effort, which often 
means they engage in project work “after hours” away from their day job, and often at 
home; and (vi) the trust and social accountability they build up and sustain through 
ongoing interaction with others participants in the project who they believe are acting in a 
similar way to sustain their overall collective activity. Once again, the choices OSSD 
participants make in mobilizing the personal resources they invest in the OSSD project, 
GNUe.org developers effectively constrain their collective effort in ways that make the 
ongoing project a self-governing project community that lacks a central budget, schedule, 
or resource allocation authority, yet realizes much of the resources needed to sustain (but 
not yet grow) the GNUe.org project community.
Resources and Artifacts as Objects of Interaction
Much of the development work that occurs in an OSSD project centers around the 
creation, update, and other actions (e.g., copy, move, delete) applied to a variety of 
software development artifacts. These artifacts serve as coordination mechanisms 
[Schmidt and Simone 1996, Simone and Mark 1999], in that they help participants 
communicate, document, and otherwise make sense of what the emerging software 
system is suppose to do, how it should be or was accomplished, who did what, what went 
wrong before, how to fix it, and so forth. Furthermore, within a project community these 
artifacts help coordinate local, project-specific development activities, whereas between 
multiple project communities, these artifacts emerge as boundary objects [Lee 2007] 
through which inter-community activities and relations are negotiated and revised.  The 
artifacts may take the form of text messages posted to a project discussion list, Web 
pages, source code directories and files, site maps, and more, and they are employed as 
the primary media through which software requirements and design are expressed. These 
artifacts are software informalisms [Scacchi 2002]. They are especially important as 
coordination mechanisms in OSSD projects since participants generally are not co-
located, they do not meet face-to-face, and authority and expertise relationships among 
participants is up for grabs. 
In the context of the NetBeans.org project and its role within a larger Web-compatible 
information infrastructure, additional artifacts come into play within and across projects. 
These include the content transfer protocols like the HyperText Transfer Protocol (http) 
which are systematically specified in Internet standards like RFC documents, as well as 
more narrowly focused communication state controllers associated with remote 
procedure calls (or remote method invocations). They also include shared data 
description formats like the HyperText Markup Language (html) and the eXtensible 
Markup Language (XML), as well as client-side or server-side data processing scripts 
(e.g., CGI routines). Such descriptions may be further interpreted to enable externally 
developed modules to serve as application/module plug-ins, which enable secondary or 
embedded applications to be associated with an OSS system. Other artifacts are brought 
in from other OSSD projects to serve as project support tools, such as those used to 
record and store system defect reports (Issuezilla1), email list managers, and even large 
comprehensive collaborative software development environments and project portals, 
like CollabNet (www.collab.net) or SourceCast [Augustin, Bressler, and Smith 2002]. 
Finally, OSSD projects may share static and operational artifacts in the course of 
collaborating or cooperating through mutually intelligible and interoperable development 
processes, which might take an explicit form like the Java Community Process (JCP), or 
an implicit and embedded form such as that which emerges from use of project 
repositories whose contents are shared and synchronized through tools that control and 
track alternative versions (CVS) or Web site content updates.
Accordingly, in order to explore where issues of collaboration, leadership, control and 
conflict may arise within or across related OSSD projects, then one place to look to see 
such issues is in how project participants create, update, exchange, debate, and make 
sense of the software informalisms that are employed to coordinate their development 
activities. This is the approach taken here in exploring the issues both within the 
NetBeans.org project community, as well as across the fragile software ecosystem of 
inter-related OSSD projects that situate NetBeans.org within a Web information 
infrastructure [Jensen and Scacchi 2005].
Meso-Level Analysis of OSSD Project Community Issues
As noted earlier, NetBeans.org is a large and complex OSSD project. We have observed at 
least  three kinds of  governance elements that  arise  within an  OSSD community like 
NetBeans.org. These are collaboration, leadership and control, and conflict.
Collaboration
According to the NetBeans.org community Web site, interested individuals may participate 
in the community by joining in discussions on  mailing lists, filing bug and enhancement 
reports,  contributing  Web  content,  source  code,  newsletter  articles,  and  language 
translations.  These activities can be done in isolation, without coordinating with other 
community members, and then offered up for consideration and inclusion.  As we’ll see, 
reducing the need for collaboration is a common practice in the community that gives rise 
to positive and negative effects.  We discuss collaboration in terms of policies that support 
process  structures  that  prevent  conflict,  looking  at  task  completion  guidelines  and 
community architecture.
Policies and Guidelines
The  NetBeans.org community has  detailed procedural guidelines2 for  most  common 
development tasks, from submitting bug fixes to user interface design and creating a new 
release.   These  guidelines come  in  two  flavors:  development task  and  design  style 
1 http://www.netbeans.org/kb/articles/issuezilla.html   
2 http://www.netbeans.org.org/community/guidelines/   
guidelines.  In  general,  these  policies  are  practiced and  followed without  question. 
Ironically, the procedures for policy revision have not been specified.  
Precedent states that revisions are brought up on the community or module discussion 
mailing  lists,  where  they  are  debated  and  either  ratified  or  rejected  by  consensus. 
Developers are expected to take notice of the decision and act accordingly, while the 
requisite guideline documents are updated to reflect the changes.  In addition, as some 
communities resort to “public flogging” for failure to follow stated procedures, requests for 
revision are rare and usually well known among concerned parties, so no such flogging is 
done within NetBeans.org.  
Overall, these policies allow individual developers to work independently within a process 
structure that enables collaboration by encouraging or reinforcing developers to work in 
ways that are expected by their fellow community members, as well as congruent with the 
community process.
Separation of Concerns: an Architectural Strategy for Collaborative Success
Software products are increasingly developing a modular, plug-in  application  program 
interface (API) architectural style in order to facilitate development of add-on components 
that extend system functionality.  This strategy has been essential in an open source arena 
that carries freedom of extensibility as a basic privilege or, in some cases, the right of free 
speech or freedom of expression through contributed source code.  But this separation of 
concerns strategy for code management also provides a degree of separation of concerns in 
developer management, and therefore, collaboration.  
In concept, a module team can take the plug-in API specification and develop a modular 
extension for the system using any development process in complete isolation from the rest 
of  the  community.  This  ability  is  very  attractive to  third-party contributors in  the 
NetBeans.org community  who  may  be  uninterested in  becoming  involved with  the 
technical and socio-political issues of the community, or who are unwilling or unable to 
contribute their source code back to the community.  Thus, this separation of concerns in 
the  NetBeans.org design architecture engenders separation of  concerns in  the  process 
architecture.  Of course, this is limited by the extent that each module in NetBeans.org is 
dependent on other modules.  
Last, volunteer community members have periodically observed difficulties collaborating 
with volunteer community members. For example, at one point a lack of responsiveness of 
the  (primarily Sun  employed) user  interface team3,  whose influence spans the  entire 
community, could be  observed.  This coordination breakdown led to the monumental 
failure of usability efforts for a period when usability was arguably the most-cited reason 
users chose competing tools over NetBeans.org.  Thus, a collaboration failure gave rise to 
product failure.  Only by overcoming collaboration issues was NetBeans.org able to deliver 
a satisfactory usability experience4. 
Leadership and Control
3  http://www.netbeans.org.org/servlets/ReadMsg?msgId=531512&listName=nbdiscuss   
4  http://www.javalobby.org/thread.jspa?forumID=61&threadID=9550#top   
Ignoring internal Sun (and third party) enterprise structure, there are five observable layers 
of the NetBeans.org community hierarchy. Members may take on multiple roles some of 
which span several of these layers. At the bottom layer are users, followed by source 
contributors, module-level managers, project level release managers (i.e. IDE or platform), 
and finally, community level managers (i.e. IDE  and platform) at  the top-most layer. 
Interestingly, the “management” positions are simply limited to coordinating roles; they 
carry no other technical or managerial authority.  The release manager, for example, has no 
authority to determine what will be included in and excluded from the release5.  Nor does 
s/he have the authority to assign people to complete the tasks required to release the 
product.  The same is true of module and community managers.  Instead, their role is to 
announce the tasks that need to be done and wait for volunteers to accept responsibility.  
Accountability and  expectations of  responsibility are  based  solely  on  precedent and 
volunteerism rather than explicit assignment, leading to confusion of the role of parties 
contributing to  development.  Leadership is  not  asserted until  a  community member 
champions a cause and while volunteerism is expected, this expectation is not always 
obvious.  The lack of a clear authority structure is both a cause of freedom and chaos in 
open source development.  Though often seen as one of its strengths in comparison to 
closed source efforts, it can lead to process failure if no one steps forward to perform 
critical activities or if misidentified expectations cause dissent.  
The difficulties in collaboration across organizations within the community occasionally 
brought up in the community mailing lists stem from the lack of a shared understanding 
leadership in the community.  This manifests itself in two ways: a lack of transparency in 
the decision making process and decision making without community consent.  While not 
new phenomenon, they are especially poignant in a movement whose basic tenets include 
freedom and knowledge sharing.
    Transparency in the Decision Making Process
In  communities with  a  corporately backed  core  development effort,  there  are  often 
decisions made that create a community-wide impact that are made company meetings. 
However,  these  decisions  may  not  be  explicitly  communicated to  the  rest  of  the 
community.  Likewise private communication between parties that is not made available on 
the community Web space or to the forwarded to other members is also hidden.  This lack 
of  transparency in  decision-making process  makes  it  difficult  for  other  community 
members  to  understand and  comply  with  the  changes  taking  place  if  they  are  not 
questioned or  rejected.  This effect surfaced in the NetBeans.org community recently 
following a discussion of modifying the release process6.  
Given the magnitude of contributions from the primary benefactor, other developers were 
unsure of the responsibility and authority Sun assumed within the development process. 
The lack of a clearly stated policy outlining these bounds led to a flurry of excitement when 
Sun members announced major changes to the licensing scheme used by the community 
5  http://www.netbeans.org.org/community/guidelines/process.html   
6  http://www.netbeans.org/servlets/BrowseList?listName=nbdiscuss&by=thread&from=19116&to=19116&fi  
rst=1&count=41  
without any warning.  It has also caused occasional collaboration breakdown throughout 
the community due to expectations of who would carry out which development tasks.  The 
otherwise implicit nature of  Sun's contributions in  relation to  other organizations and 
individuals has been revealed primarily through precedent rather than assertion.
   Consent in the Decision Making Process
Without an authority structure, all decisions in development are done through consensus, 
except among those lacking transparency.  In the case of the licensing scheme change, 
some developers felt that Sun was within its rights as the major contributor and the most 
exposed to legal threat  7 while others saw it as an attack on the "democratic protection 
mechanisms" of the community that ensure fairness between participating parties8.  A lack 
of consideration and transparency in the decision making process tend to alienate those 
who are not consulted and erode the sense of community.
Conflict Resolution
Conflicts in the NetBeans.org community are resolved via community discussion mailing 
lists.  The process usually begins when one member announces dissatisfaction with an issue 
in development.  Those who also feel concern with the particular issue then write responses 
to the charges raised.  At some point, the conversation dissipates- usually when emotions 
are set aside and clarifications have been made that provide an understanding of the issue at 
hand.   If  the  problem persists, the  community governance board is  tasked with  the 
responsibility of resolving the matter.
The governance board is composed of three individuals and has the role of ensuring the 
fairness throughout the community by solving persistent disputes. Two of the members are 
elected by the community, and one is  appointed by Sun Microsystems. The board is, 
historically, a largely superficial entity whose authority and scope are questionable and 
untested. While it has been suggested that the board intercede on a few rare occasions, the 
disputes have dissolved before the board has  acted. Nevertheless, board elections are 
dutifully held every six months9.   
Board members are typically prominent members in the community.  Their status carries 
somewhat more weight in community policy discussions, however, even when one member 
has suggested a decision, as no three board members have ever voted in resolution on any 
issue, and thus, it  is  unclear what effect would result.  Their role, then, is  more of a 
mediator: to drive community members to resolve the issue amongst themselves.  To this 
end, they have been effective.
Macro-Level Analysis of OSSD Governance Across Community Issues
As noted earlier, the NetBeans.org project is not an isolated OSSD project. Instead, the 
NetBeans IDE which is the focus of development activities in the NetBeans.org project 
community is  envisioned to  support  the  interactive development of  Web-compatible 
7  http://www.netbeans.org.org/servlets/ReadMsg?msgId=534707&listName=nbdiscuss   
8  http://www.netbeans.org.org/servlets/ReadMsg?msgId=534520&listName=nbdiscuss   
9  http://www.netbeans.org.org/about/os/who-board.html   
software applications or services that can be accessed, executed, or served through other 
OSS systems like the Mozilla Web browser and Apache Web server. Thus, it is reasonable 
to explore how the NetBeans.org project community is situated within an ecosystem of 
inter-related OSSD projects that facilitate or constrain the intended usage of the NetBeans 
IDE. Figure 1  provides a  rendering of  some of  the more visible OSSD projects that 
surround and  embed the  NetBeans.org within a  Web information infrastructure. This 
rendering also suggests that issues of like collaboration  and conflict can arise at  the 
boundaries between projects, and thus these issues constitute  relations that can emerge 
between  project communities  in OSSD ecosystem.
Figure 1. An overview of some of the OSS projects that surround and situate development 
activities within the NetBeans.org OSS project [Jensen and Scacchi 2005].
With such a framing in mind, we have observed at least three kinds of issues arise across 
OSSD communities that surround the NetBeans.org community. These are communication 
and collaboration, leadership and control, and conflict resolution.
Communication and Collaboration
In addition to their IDE, NetBeans.org also releases a general application development 
platform on which the IDE is based.  Other organizations, such as BioBeans and RefactorIT 
communities build tools on top of or extending the NetBeans platform or IDE.  How do 
these organizations interact with NetBeans.org, and how does NetBeans.org interact with 
other  IDE  and  platform  producing  organizations?   For  some  organizations,  this 
collaboration may occur in terms of bug reports and feature requests submitted to the 
NetBeans.org issue-tracking repository.  Additionally, they may also submit patches or 
participate in discussions on community mailing list or participate in the NetBeans.org 
“Move the Needle” branding initiative.  Beyond this, NetBeans.org participates in the Sun 
sponsored Java.net meta-community, which hosts hundreds of Java-based OSSD projects 
developed by tens of thousands of individuals and organizations.  
A fellow member of the Java.net community is an attempt to bring tool developers together 
to form standards for tool interoperability. However, the Java Tools Community, considered 
by some to be a working group10 for the Java Community Process. Thus NetBeans.org, 
through its relationship with Sun, is a collaborating community in the development of, and 
through compliance with, these standards, and looks to increasing collaboration with other 
tool developing organizations.
Leadership and Control
OSSD generally embrace the notion of choice between software products to build or use. 
At the same time, developers in any community seek success for their community, which 
translates to market share.  
In some cases, communities developing alternative tools do so in peaceful coexistence, 
even collaboratively.  In other cases,  there is  a greater sense of competition between 
rivals.  NetBeans and its chief competitor Eclipse (backed largely by IBM) fall into the 
latter  category.  Eclipse  has  enjoyed some favor from users  due  to performance and 
usability issues of NetBeans, as well as IBM's significant marketing and development 
resource contributions.  Yet, they have a willingness to consider collaborative efforts to 
satisfy demands for a single, unified IDE for the Java language that would serve as a 
platform for building Java development tools and a formidable competitor to Microsoft's 
.NET.  Ultimately, the union was defeated, largely due to technical and organizational 
differences between Sun and IBM11, including the inability or unwillingness to determine 
how to  integrate  the  architectures  and  code  bases  for  their  respective  user  interface 
development frameworks (Swing for NetBeans and SWT for Eclipse).
Conflict Resolution
Conflicts between collaborating communities are resolved in similar fashion to their means 
of communication--through discussion between Sun and Eclipse representatives, comments 
on the NetBeans.org mailing lists, or other prominent technical forums (e.g. Slashdot and 
developer blogs).  Unfortunately, many of these discussions occur after the collaborating 
developer has moved away from using NetBeans.org (often, in favor of Eclipse). 
Nevertheless, the feedback they provide gives both parties an opportunity to increase 
understanding and assists the NetBeans.org community by guiding their technical direction. 
Discussion 
Public communication channels we have seen used in OSSD projects like the GNUE.org 
and NetBeans.org  include mailing lists, defect repositories, requests for enhancement, 
Internet Relay Chat (IRCs), developer/stakeholder blogs and Web pages, trade forums, 
and developer conferences.  Of these, mailing lists, defect repositories, and requests for 
10  http://www.internetnews.com/dev-news/article.php/3295991   
11http://www.adtmag.com/article.asp?id=8634  ,   http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1460110,00.asp
enhancement (RFEs) are intra-organizational--they exist within project community 
boundaries.  IRC chats and developer conferences that facilitate communication may be 
intra or inter-organizational, in that they can be hosted by the community or by other 
organizations.  On the other hand, stakeholder blogs and Web pages and trade forums are 
purely inter-organizational.  Communication channels provide means for enabling 
intrinsic governance in OSSD projects through collaboration, leadership, control, and 
conflict negotiation processes.  But they do not tell us much about how developers 
collaborate, lead, control, and resolve conflicts, nor what is collaborated on, led, 
controlled, and causing/resolving conflicts.  We address that here. 
In the NetBeans community, we have observed the following objects of interaction which 
guide OSSD technical development and social integration processes: 
• Project and software system architecture 
• The community vision/mission statement 
• Release plans and development roadmap 
• Community policies, task guidelines, and interaction guidelines 
• Defect reports and request for enhancements (RFEs) 
• Mailing list discussions 
• Private meetings (work done by organizations associated with the community) 
Arguing that project architecture is a primary coordination mechanism for software 
development,   Ovaska and colleagues [2003], and also Baldwin and Clark [2006], 
observed six coordination processes in multi-site software development like OSSD 
projects.  These include managing interfaces between system components, managing 
assembly order of system components, managing the interdependence of system 
components, communication, overall responsibility, and orientation (configuration) of the 
organization.  There are several processes in which governance and coordination is 
manifested.  
As suggested above, community interaction modes act as communication channels for 
governing, coordinating, and articulating of development tasks.  Community mission 
statements are important to the formation of the community social and technical 
infrastructure early in the community’s lifespan when more concrete guidelines have not 
been explicitly stated (if established). They are the core instructions for the way 
individuals and organizations will interact with the community as a whole.  But they are 
also a metric by which each release will be judged.  
Additional release planning activities in OSSD typically consist of asserting the 
requirements for the release (what work will be done), the schedule of the release (when 
will the work be completed), and who will be responsible for what work (who will do 
what work) [Scacchi, 2002].  
Defect/product recovery and redesign, as registered through submission of bug/defect 
reports is an integral coordination process.  Like release planning, defect reports and 
RFCs (Request for Comments) tell developers both what work needs to be done  as well 
as what has not been done yet, without an explicit owner or administrative supervisor to 
assign responsibility for doing it.  
These suggest that governance processes are inherent in activities requiring coordination 
or leadership to determine which development tasks need to be done and when they need 
to be completed. This is analogous to what has previously been observed by management 
scholars (and also OSS developers) as adaptive “Internet Time” development practices 
[Cusumano 1999] that enable a kind of project self-governance through adaptive 
synchronization and stabilization activities.
In some instances, leadership in coordinating development tasks is done in private 
meetings or communications between developers, for which little evidence is public or 
observable.  However, we observed leadership and control of OSSD project community 
through: 
• Contribution of software informalisms (e.g., source, defect reports, requests for 
changes, news, internationalizations, etc. [Scacchi 2002]) 
• Articulating and sharing technical expertise (e.g., on the mailing lists and defect 
repository reports, [Elliott, Ackerman, and Scacchi 2007]) 
• Coordination of development and other tasks (e.g., through the role of the 
release manager, module maintainer, and source code contributors with “commit 
access” to shared source code repositories). 
OSSD communities are often controlled and governed through a skill and commitment-
based meritocracy.  With a contribution-based reputation scheme, GNUe.org and 
NetBeans.org are no exception.  Control of each community's technical direction depends 
on what OSS code contributions, defect reports, patches, and enhancement requests are 
submitted and enacted.  Developers volunteering on high-demand or critical path aspects 
of the project will likely have many peers needing to coordinate, synchronize and 
stabilize their activities in order to integrate the outcomes of their work.  If the 
implementation is consistent with the requirements and does not negatively impact the 
efforts of other community members, the direction of the contribution will stand. 
Otherwise, community members will execute a conflict resolution process.  As 
developers consistently demonstrate quality in their social and technical contributions, 
their peers take notice.  There are also non-technical aspects of the community that are 
controlled.  These include control of source licensing schemes, social community 
infrastructure, and inter-organizational relationships.  
The NetBeans.org community is a complex case: it receives the majority of its financial 
and core developmental support from Sun Microsystems.  Sun, as the primary benefactor 
and community founder, established the community vision, social and technical 
infrastructure, many core developers, and initiates most release plans, driving the 
development roadmap. Thus, Sun is most exposed to risks from community failure and 
external threats.  As demonstrated by Sun’s move to alter the project licensing scheme, 
exercising this authority unilaterally led to division within the community, risking 
breakdown of the project and development process.  As such, social process conflict can 
give rise to conflict within the overall technical development process. 
In contrast, the GNUe.org community though significantly smaller, is a similar case in 
some ways. First, external enterprises that contribute paid or volunteer software 
development staff do so as an investment that seeks financial returns to these companies 
buy providing them with software that they can in turn market to their customers [Scacchi 
2007a]. Second, GNUe.org is ideologically aligned with the Free Software Foundation 
(www.fsf.org) and the General Public License (GPL) for software. The FSF serves as a 
non-profit enterprise that advocates the advancement of “free software” (as opposed to 
“open source software”) as a social movement seeking to transform and liberate software 
users from the technical and moral confines of proprietary software (cf. www.fsf.org). 
The need to practice such liberation is subsequently reiterated by community members 
through informalisms routinely used by GNUe.org participants, and through technical 
choices made by participants regarding which tools and techniques should (those aligned 
with free software) and should not (those aligned with proprietary software) be used. 
Last, the FSF does however identify and support GNUe.org as one of its official projects, 
and provides modest support through hosting of GNUe.org project Web site and 
information repositories. 
Based on this, sources of conflict that precipitate some form of governance may arise 
from: 
• Community infrastructure, sociopolitical vision, and direction
• Technical direction (what should be in the release, when should a release occur, 
which tools to use to develop software) 
• How developers can get involved in making decisions and what roles they play 
• Relationships between and alignment of the diverse goals of many organized 
groups 
(e.g., corporations) and unaffiliated volunteers involved in the community 
These conflicts are resolved through OSSD governance activities in a variety of ways. 
When conflicts arise due to miscommunication or lack of communication between 
developers, or between developers and organized groups contributing to the community, 
resolution is reached by talking it out on community mailing lists.  In more pronounced 
cases, it may take project veterans and highly influential community members to act as 
mediators.  Failing this, in NetBeans.org, the project culture prescribes that developers 
shall bring the issue to the governance board for deliberation, who will issue a final 
decision on the matter.  Board involvement is viewed as a last resort, and community 
members are encouraged to resolve their conflicts through other means. In contrast, in 
GNUe.org, the culture of free software aligned with the FSF espouses moral values and 
choices should guide technical choices, and thus these values, norms, and beliefs govern 
project activities [Elliott and Scacchi 2005].
All told, social and technical conflicts are intertwined in OSSD.  Lacking formal process 
prescriptions, if the social processes are running smoothly, all that needs to be articulated 
and synchronized are technical development processes.  But if the technical process is too 
ambiguous or not specified explicitly as is often the case in OSSD, developers must rely 
on collaboration, leadership, control, and conflict negotiation to fill in the gaps in 
governing the OSSD process.  In other words, social processes like collaboration, 
leadership and control, and conflict resolution are ways for governing OSSD through 
articulating and reconfiguring the technical processes that are either unstated or 
understated.  In a way, articulation is the background process of making sure people 
understand the technical development process [Strauss 1988].  As such, when there is a 
breakdown, whose responsibility is it to address or resolve the breakdown?  In both the 
NetBeans.org and GNUe.org project communities, accountability is only partially 
assigned but does exist in some fashions.  No complete articulation of the management 
infrastructure exists in NetBeans.org or GNUe.org.  The emerging processes to do this are 
collaboration, leadership, control, and conflict negotiation, which are used to continually 
re-articulate the process and figure out what is going on at present.  Based on our study, 
the OSSD process is best understood neither as primarily a technical development or 
social process, but instead as an inherent network of interacting socio-technical 
processes, where its technical and social processes are intertwined, co-dependent, co-
evolving, and thus inseparable in performance.  
Implications of OSS Governance for DoD
Based on the results of the studies presented here, the appears to be a great opportunity 
for the DoD community to look for ways to acquire expertise and practice in 
decentralized edge organizations, where OSS projects may provide such an opportunity. 
In addition to recommending on-going studies of governance practices in different OSS 
projects of various size, complexity and degree of decentralization, it also seems prudent 
for DoD or the services to undertake their own OSS development projects. Building or 
sustaining an OSS project provides the opportunity and experience of working within a 
network-centric edge organization. For example, it now appears that it is both technically 
possible and feasible to construct software-based command and control systems or 
applications from freely available OSS technologies. Why develop command and control 
systems using OSS? First, to demonstrate its feasibility, since if it can be done using 
current military forces who are skilled in network-centric software development (and 
more of the forces are increasingly computer-skilled), it can potentially be done by any 
group with sufficient interest, skilled contributors, and networked computing resources 
where ever they might be in the world. This is a strategic concern. Second, in order to 
gain first-hand experience and insight for learning how to develop complex systems 
within a decentralized organization, then it seems that a system or application of high 
interest is a natural area to investigate or develop. Last, in order to experiment with 
whether or how smaller, decentralized military units might operate as edge organizations 
with both local versions of an open command and control system that can interoperate 
with a larger, regional command and control system/application, then it is necessary to 
both have low cost C2 systems, as well as forces who are skilled in developing, using, 
and updating their own network-centric C2 systems, rather than expecting a remote 
contractor to do all of the necessary OSS development work.
Conclusions
OSS governance is realized through intrinsic socio-technical interaction networks 
(STINs). The contingent configuration of such STINs determines which forms of socio-
technical activity will be governed with the locally relevant governance process, 
situation, or mechanism. Though these STINs may be effective in realizing intrinsic 
governance of OSSD actors and activities, STINs do not yet appear to be a convenient 
mechanism that can be employed proactively, or subjected to administrative control or 
manipulation. However, this may also just reflect that fact that they are intrinsic forms 
and capabilities, rather than extrinsic forms or mechanisms that are easy to mesh with 
existing project management or administrative authority regimes. 
The results and interpretations we present on intrinsic governance forms, conditions, and 
activities as STINs are limited and therefore preliminary, though based on empirical case 
studies. They are limited in that our analysis focuses on two contrasting case studies, 
which differ in many ways, and thus represent an initial sample with little knowledge 
about whether what we have observed in representative of other types, sizes, or samples 
of OSSD project communities. Additional studies may in turn lead us to revise our 
emerging, but preliminary model of how governance is realized in globally distributed 
OSSD project communities. However, we do believe that there is immediate value in 
recognizing the distinction between extrinsic versus intrinsic views of how governance in 
OSSD project communities operates, and whether/how such knowledge might be of use 
within the world of the DoD, or within applications of OSS within command and control 
systems, or future combat systems [cf. Justice 2007, Starrett 2007].
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